Section 8: Federalism by Institute of Bill of Rights Law at the William & Mary Law School
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Supreme Court Preview Conferences, Events, and Lectures
1996
Section 8: Federalism
Institute of Bill of Rights Law at The College of William & Mary School of Law
Copyright c 1996 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/preview
Repository Citation
Institute of Bill of Rights Law at The College of William & Mary School of Law, "Section 8: Federalism" (1996). Supreme Court Preview.
Paper 74.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/preview/74
SESSION ENDS WITH CONFLICTING VIEWS ON STATES' RIGHTS
The Hartford Courant
Tuesday, July 2, 1996
David Lightman, Washington Bureau Chief
Sometime in the future, when consumers try to
sue tobacco manufacturers and makers of faulty
medical devices, or stop Indian casinos from
multiplying, they might look back and applaud
Supreme Court decisions from the term that ended
Monday.
But experts say the court set few important
precedents this term that make it easier for states to
protect the health and safety of constituents.
Justices wrote a lot of "plurality opinions," or
those where no firm majority could be cobbled
together. The results of the 1995-96 term were
"muddled," said Kevin Tierney, professor of law at
the University of California's Hastings College of
the Law in San Francisco.
Connecticut Attorney General Richard
Blumenthal called the court "more fractured and
more factioned than at any point in its history. It is
very deeply and frequently divided, unable to form
consensus or give ground."
In the area of states' rights, said Kevin J.
Worthen, professor of law at Brigham Young
University's J. Reuben Clark Law School, what
pattern did emerge was this: If a case involved what
was largely a procedural question - such as the
Indian case -- or one involving prisoner rights, the
court sided with states. But if states' rights clashed
with other deeply held legal principles -- notably
civil rights, free-market competition or
long-established banking procedures -- the court
rejected the attorney generals' arguments.
A TRIBE'S LAWSUIT
Four cases seemed to offer two conflicting
views of how the court saw states' rights.
States won two -- notably a challenge by the
Seminole Tribe of Florida to that state's effort to
block casino gambling. The tribe had sued the state
when state officials would not discuss its casino bid.
Florida claimed sovereign immunity. The
Supreme Court ruled 5-4 that states need not be
subject to federal lawsuits if negotiations between
states and Indian tribes break down.
"The case is extraordinarily significant in very
lasting, profound ways," Blumenthal said, because
it revived the 11th Amendment, which protects
states from being sued in federal courts without their
consent
"We have found that Congress does not have
authority to make the state suable in federal court,"
wrote Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist.
The second win for states came last week. A
federal court ruled that Arizona officials had to
provide illiterate inmates and those who do not
speak English access to legal help.
The Supreme Court disagreed, and Justice
Antonin Scalia issued a tough warning to courts
who want, in effect, to run prison systems. "This
case is a model of what should not [be done]," he
said, calling the district court ruling "inordinately --
indeed, wildly -- intrusive."
Still, any bold trend toward broader states'
rights was harder to find than a governor's unlisted
phone number. The same week it ruled against the
prisoners, the court called Virginia Military
Institute's all-male policy unconstitutional.
Earlier in the year, it struck down a Colorado
law denying homosexuals protection against
discrimination.
To Worthen the four rulings meant "this court
is more interested in states' rights than previous
courts." But states are only likely to win, he said,
"when states' rights is the primary issue."
CREDIT CARD LATE FEES
The split decisions on states' rights mirrored the
term's outcome for consumers.
One key ruling will allow banks to charge late
payment fees to consumers, even if they live in a
state that does not permit such fees. Connecticut
banks called that good news, because it meant they
could market credit cards with such fees all over the
country.
But Blumenthal said it "greatly undermines the
state's power to protect consumers in this area."
A second case should make it easier for banks
to sell insurance. Here, the court was clear: "The
federal statute pre-empts the state statute."
Mark A. Chavez, a San Francisco attorney
specializing in consumer cases, said he fears that
banks now will try to place credit card and insurance
operations in states where regulation is most lax,
and then sell products to people all over the country.
But John Pemberton, chief policy counsel in the
legal studies division for the Washington Legal
Foundation, a research group, said he thought
consumers ultimately would benefit, because the
court was promoting competition and disclosure.
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"What these decisions say is we cannot keep
consumers in the dark about products," he said. "We
can allow people to make decisions for themselves."
A FAULTY PACEMAKER
Probably no single case summed up the states'
year like Lora and Michael Lohr vs. Mederonic,
In c.
Lora Lohr's Medtronic pacemaker failed in
1990, three years after it was installed. She
underwent emergency surgery to replace the
pacemaker and since has had four more operations.
The Lohrs sued Medtronic, which contended it could
not be sued in state courts, because of a 1976
federal law regulating medical devices.
A divided court ruled for Lohr, and in one sense,
seemed to give consumers an important victory.
Stevens wrote that the 1976 law did not intend
"a sweeping pre-emption of traditional common-law
remedies against manufacturers and distributors of
defective devices."
Trial attorneys and consumer groups rejoiced.
"A huge victoy for consumers," said Pamela A.
Liapakis, president of the Association of Trial
Lawyers of America. "The decision puts a roadblock
in the path of makers of automobiles, aircraft and
tobacco. . . ."
Attorneys said the ruling could affect lawsuits
against silicone breast implant makers. Blumenthal
said it could be helpful in the lawsuit he plans to file
this summer against tobacco companies to recover
money the state spends on smokers' medical care.
Yet the Supreme Court ruling was not an
unqualified consumer triumph. Stevens was joined
in his opinion by three other justices. Justice
Stephen G. Breyer, while siding with the majority,
said that because of ambiguities in the 1976 law,
there could be instances where federal law prevailed
over state law.
As the court term ended, perhaps fittingly, few
were quite sure what this case - or for that matter,
what this year -- ultimately meant for states and
their constituents. "It was generally positive,"
Blumenthal said of the year, "but mixed."
Copyright 196 The Hartford Courant
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STATES ON A WINNING STREAK
11th Amendment Ruling Strikes Another Blow Against Federal Power
ABA Journal
June, 1996; 82 June ABA J. 46
David G. Savage
For the third time in five years, the U.S.
Supreme Court has strengthened the sovereign
powers of the states at the expense of the authority.
of Congress.
On one level, Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida, No. 94-12 (March 27, 1996), is an attempt
to clarify how disputes between states and Native
American tribes over gambling operations should be
resolved. That issue is important enough, given the
growth in tribal casino gambling.
But on a broader level, Seminole Tribe follows
closely behind recent decisions by the Court
affirming state powers in the face of congressional
actions. In United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624
(1995), the Court struck down a federal law that
banned handguns in local school zones, and in New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), the
Court blocked legislation to force states to accept
nuclear waste dumps within their borders.
It is enough to suggest a trend. Taken together,
the three rulings upset the conventional wisdom of
recent decades that said Congress had unquestioned
power to legislate on matters of national interest.
The decisions also reflect a commitment by the
Supreme Court to re-examine the contours of
federalism. At stake may be the constitutionality of
recent federal laws on carjacking, handgun
registration, abortion clinics and drug
possession--and that is just in the short term.
"The lower courts are percolating with
challenges to the whole Clinton agenda," says
Professor Akhil Reed Amar of Yale Law School in
New Haven, Conn. Many experts, including Amar,
are quick to note, however, that the Court's recent
rulings simply restrict certain powers of Congress,
but have not reached the more revolutionary stage of
removing those powers. At least, not yet.
REDEFINING THE 11TH AMENDMENT
In 1988, Congress adopted the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act, which provided that tribes in states
that allow casino gambling may request that the
state "negotiate in good faith" to reach a compact
permitting the tribe to operate a casino. If the state
balked, the tribe could sue it in federal court for
failing to negotiate in good faith.
In a 5-4 vote, the Supreme Court struck down
this provision of the Indian Gaming Act on grounds
that the states generally have "sovereign immunity"
under the I Ith Amendment to the Constitution from
being sued by individuals in federal court.
..--"Even when the Constitution vests in Congress
complete lawmaking authority over a particular
area, the I Ith Amendment prevents congressional
authorization by private parties against
unconsenting states," wrote Chief Justice William
H. Rehnquist for the majority in Seminole Tribe.
The clash over the balance of power between
the states and the federal government is older than
the Constitution itself, and Seminole Tribe touches
on cases going back more than a century.
Ratified in 1795, the I Ith Amendment states,
"The judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit" brought against a
state "by citizens of another state, or by citizens or
subjects of any foreign state."
As written, the 11th Amendment does not
prohibit a "citizen" from suing his or her own state
in federal court but the Suprene Court imposed that
broader state immunity in Hans v. Louisiana, 134
U.S. 1 (1890).
For the past decade, however, the justices have
divided over the scope of the 11th Amendment in
decisions triggered by congressional actions
authorizing private suits against states to compel
their compliance with federal laws, especially in the
environmental area.
And more recently, Congress has pushed the
envelope by authorizing private suits against states
on an increasing number of matters as varied as
cleaning up hazardous wastes, protecting copyrights
and recovering money in bankruptcies.
In 1989, a deeply split Court ruled in
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1, that
Congress is empowered to authorize such suits.
Since then, however, four of the five justices in
the Union Gas majority have departed (William J.
Brennan Jr., Thurgood Marshall, Byron R. White
and Harry A. Blackmun), and one of the new
justices, Clarence Thomas, has emerged as a
stalwart advocate of state sovereignty. Backed by a
new, but narrow, majority, Rehnquist declared in
Seminole Tribe that Union Gas "was wrongly
decided ... and now is overruled."
The chief justice noted that Seminole Tribe
does not bar federal civil rights suits against states,
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since they are specifically authorized by the 14th
Amendment.
But the decision leaves some doubt about
whether individual state officials may be sued in
federal courts to force them to comply with laws
passed by Congress. That type of suit is the classic
end-run around the 11th Amendment that was
upheld in 1908 in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123.
Whether this tactic remains viable will be one of the
measures of the true impact of Seminole Tribe.
For now, Rehnquists-opinion does not resolve
the issue. On the one hand, he stated in a footnote
that Congress may authorize suits against state
officials, but he also rejected the Seminoles' suit
against Florida Gov. Lawton Chiles because the
Indian Gaming Act was directed at the states, not
individual officials.
On April 15, only two weeks after issuing the
Seminole Tibe ruling, the Supreme Court agreed to
hear another 11th Amendment case, this one to
clarify the conditions under which state officials can
be sued in federal court. Idaho v. Coeur D'Alene
Tribe, No. 94-1474, will be argued during the
1996-97 term.
Seminole Tribe was issued a year after Lopez,
which may eventually come to achieve landmark
status after limiting congressional power under the
commerce clause for the first time in some 60 years.
The decisions shared the same majority.
Rehnquist wrote both opinions, in which he was
joined by Justices Thomas, Sandra Day O'Connor,
Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy.
In striking down the federal Gun-Free School
Zones Act prohibiting the possession of firearms
within 1,000 feet of school grounds, Lopez
reminded that the power of Congress to regulate is
limited to "those activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce." Matters such as public
education, crime and domestic relations generally
are within the ambit of the sovereign states,
Rehnquist observed in a statement that flies in the
face of 30 years of activist law-making by Congress.
Even earlier, in 1992, the Court had kicked off
the current string of states' rights victories by
striking down Congress' effort to force states to
locate nuclear waste dumps within their borders. As
in Seminole TrIbe, the Court in New York v. United
States did not resolve the merits of the dispute, but
used the case to recognize the independent powers
of the states.
"States are not mere political subdivisions of the
United States," O'Connor wrote for the Court, and
they cannot be "commandeered" to carry out federal
purposes.
Unquestionably, Seminole Tribe and its
predecessors have sent a message. "There are five
justices who care deeply about the states having a
strong independent role," according to Washington,
D.C., lawyer Richard G. Tarunto, a former clerk to
O'Connor. "And on several fronts, they are saying to
Congress, 'Stop!"'
The message is being heard in the lower courts.
In March, the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals at
New Orleans struck down part of the Brady
Handgun Registration Act, citing O'Connor's
opinion in New York. A requirement that local
sheriffs conduct background checks on handgun
buyers until a national system is in place is
unconstitutional because it "commandeers" a local
official to carry out a federal task, the appellate
court ruled in Koog v. United States, Nos.
94-50562 and 94-60518 (March 21, 1996).
Meanwhile, the 9th Circuit at San Francisco
struck down part of a federal arson statute, in
United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522
(1995). The court reasoned that a fire at a private
dwelling with no substantial link to interstate
commerce should not be prosecuted under the
federal statute.
Federal district judges have struck down a
federal anti-caijacking statute, the Child Support
Recovery Act, and the Freedom of Abortion Clinic
Entrances Act on the basis of the Supreme Court's
recent rulings limiting federal power.
Some criminal defense lawyers are challenging
federal drug possession laws. After all, they argue if
Congress lacks the power to make it a crime to
possess a gun near a school, how can it declare
possession of crack cocaine at home to be a federal
crime?
Legal experts are divided on how far the Court
will push the "new" federalism, but most agree that
Justice Kennedy will be the key vote in upcoming
decisions.
"I think if [the conservative justices] go too far,
they are likely to lose Justice Kennedy," says Barry
Friedman, a professor at Vanderbilt University
School of Law in Nashville, Tenn.
Last term, Kennedy split from the states' rights
faction in U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct.
1842 (1995), by supporting the majority in striking
down state laws that limited the terms of elected
members of Congress. Though federalism is a
crown jewel of the American constitutional system,
Kennedy wrote, members of Congress are national
officers whose service should be governed by a
uniform national rule.
Friedman and others suggest it will take further
rulings by the Supreme Court to clarify this area.
"Lopez has a lot of gray areas, and we won't know
until that becomes clearer," he says.
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Certainly within the Court, the struggle
promises to continue. Justice David H. Souter filed
a 92-page dissent in Seminole Tribe, arguing that
the majority's view of the 1 Ith Amendment was
wrong as a matter of history.
And in a separate 26-page dissent, Justice John
Paul Stevens denounced Rehnquist's opinion as
"shocking . . . misguided . . . [and] simply
irresponsible. The better reasoning in Justice
Souter's far wiser and far more scholarly opinion
will surely be the law one day."
Only time, and more decisions, will tell.
Copyright (c) American Bar Association, 1996
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THE NATION-TAKING STATES SERIOUSLY
The New York Times
Sunday, April 14, 1996
Linda Greenhouse
For much of his nearly quarter century on the
Supreme Court, William H. Rehnquist was the
outrider. Often in dissent, he traveled far from the
pack, tracing a singular path across a constitutional
landscape that. in his view was strewn with
monuments to the modem Court's errors. Prominent
among these were the Court's precedents elevating
the power of the Federal Government at the expense
of the individual states.
Now approaching his 10th anniversary as Chief
Justice, Mr. Rehnquist began to put his years as a
lone dissenter behind as Presidents Reagan and
Bush reshaped the Court around him. These days, he
is the general in charge of a constitutional war along
the Federal-state frontier. Aided by timing, patience
and, to no small extent, the good luck of having
colleagues who agree with him that the states'
interests have been submerged for too long, he is
conducting this high-stakes war along several fronts
of distinct but interrelated constitutional doctrine.
And he is winning. When the Rehnquist Court
passes into history--the 71 -year-old Chief Justice is
widely expected to retire within the next few years
-- a reshaping of the Federal-state balance may
prove his most enduring legacy. He has been
frustrated in other areas where he lacks a working
majority - the right to abortion is still the law of the
land, and organized prayer is not back in public
schools. But for Federal-state relations, his tenure
could mark a historic shift.
STATES' RIGHTS
Last month, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote an
opinion for a 5-to-4 majority in a case that gave new
teeth to one of the Constitution's more obscure and
ambiguous provisions, the 11th Amendment. The
amendment, adopted in 1795 in response to the
states' fears of being sued for Revolutionary War
debts, shields a state from being sued in Federal
court by a citizen of another state. The Court
subsequently interpreted the 11th Amendment to bar
suits by a state's own citizens as well in an 1890
decision that Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion last
week in Seminole Tribe v. Florida essentially
revised and placed on firmer constitutional footing
than ever before.
The Seminole Tribe decision struck down a
portion of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, a
Federal law governing the terms by which Indian
tribes can conduct gambling on their reservations.
The Court held that, despite Congress's virtually
complete constitutional authority to legislate in the
area of Indian affairs and the states' lack of any such
authority, the law's provision permitting tribes to
sue a state to bring it to the bargaining table violated
the 11th Amendment.
The decision contained several loopholes;
people can still sue states on equal protection
grounds and seek injunctions to keep individual
state officials from violating Federal law. But it
calls into question the authority of Congress to
insure that people can vindicate their Federally
guaranteed rights in Federal court.
The I Ith Amendment case followed by less
than a year an important victory by the Chief Justice
on another front: Congress's authority to regulate
interstate commerce. In United States v. Lopez, the
Court found for the first time in 60 years that
Congress had exceeded its authority by making it a
Federal crime to carry a gun within 1,000 feet of a
school. Such an act, the Chief Justice said, was
simply not commerce.
As with the Seminole Tribe case, the
significance of United States v. Lopez lay in its
implications, in its turning away from the prevailing
notion that Congress knew best and that the
authentic vision of American history was "the steady
and inevitable triumph of nationalism," as Wilfred
M. McClay, a historian at Tulane University, wrote
recently in Commentary.
A Rehnquist opinion rings no such rhetorical
bells. The Lopez opinion was typically dry and to
the point. To agree with the Government that
Congress had the power it claimed would require the
Court to conclude "that there never will be a
distinction between what is truly national and what
is truly local," the Chief Justice said. "This," he
added, "we are unwilling to do."
Federal courts have since struck down a Federal
arson law as applied to a private home - seen as
insufficiently connected to interstate commerce --
and the Child Support Recovery Act, which brings
some "deadbeat dad" cases within Federal
jurisdiction.
The mightiest constitutional engine of all for
returning power to the states may be the 10th
Amendment, which has been absent from the
Court's docket for the last few years but may soon
return in force.
The 10th Amendment provides that powers not
delegated by the Constitution to the Federal
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Government are reserved to the states. Its history as
a charter of state sovereignty has been fitful, with
the Chief Justice its most ardent modem champion
on the Court.
Four years ago, he joined an opinion by Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor that invoked the 10th
Amendment to strike down a Federal law that
required the states to take responsibility for
disposing of the low-level radioactive waste
generated within their borders. Referring to the
Constitution as dividing power "among sovereigns,"..
Justice O'Connor said the Federal Government
could not "commandeer" the states "into the service
of Federal regulatory purposes."
TICKING DECISIONS
For several years, the decision, New York v.
United States, sat quietly ticking. But last month,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit relied heavily on it to strike down a section
of the 1994 Brady Handgun Violence Protection Act
that requires local sheriffs to make background
checks of handgun purchasers. The Brady law
makes states the "victims of impermissible Federal
coercion," the appeals court said. Two other appeals
courts had upheld the law, so Supreme Court review
is all but inevitable.
In addition to Justice O'Connor, a former state
legislator and judge in Arizona who came to the
Court as a passionate advocate for state interests,
the Chief Justice's allies are Justices Antonin Scalia,
Anthony M. Kennedy and Clarence Thomas. (It is
an interesting twist that the only other Justice with
state government experience, David H. Souter, a
former New Hampshire attorney general and state
court judge, has brought equal passion to dissenting
opinions that have made the argument for Federal
authority.)
While solid for now, the Chief Justice's margin
is thin enough to make it likely that hearings for his
successor -- or for any Justice -- will spend
substantial time on the nominee's views on
federalism. After years of controversy over race,
sex, religion and abortion, who could have predicted
that the 10th Amendment, the 11th Amendment and
the Commerce Clause would hold center stage? But
if the confirmation process is a window into what
people hope for and fear from the Court at any given
moment, they just might.
The New York Times Copyright 1996
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DECISION SETS LIMIT ON SUITS VS. STATES
Tribes Can't Sue States Opposed to Casinos, Supreme Court Says
The Herald-Sun (Durham, N.C.)
Thursday, March 28, 1996
Aaron Epstein, Knight-Ridder
WASHINGTON -- Strengthening states' rights
at the expense of Congress, the Supreme Court on
Wednesday dramatically curbed the ability of people
to sue states for violating many federal laws.
The potential impact of the court's extraordinary
5-4 ruling provoked dissenters to denounce the
decision with such words of alarm as "shocking,"
"amazing" and "simply irresponsible."
The court used a dispute over Indian gambling
to breathe life into the Constitution's dormant 11th
Amendment, which shields states from being sued in
federal courts against their will.
Congress violated the amendment by giving
American Indian tribes a federal right to sue states
that refused to negotiate agreements on gambling on
Indian lands, the court said.
The ruling is expected to slow, but not stop, the
expansion of gambling casinos on Indian
reservations, which has grown into a $ 6
billion-a-year industry in 23 states and turned some
Native American entrepreneurs into millionaires.
Despite state objections, tribes are entitled to
seek approval of their gambling plans directly from
the U.S. Department of the Interior, lawyers said.
"States win, Congress loses and the tribes are still
holding the cards," said Bruce Rogow, a law
professor who represented Florida's Seminole tribe
in the case.
But the impact of the decision reached far
beyond casinos on reservations.
While civil rights enforcement against states
was untouched, dissenter John Paul Stevens said the
ruling would prohibit federal suits to enforce
environmental, antitrust, bankruptcy, copyright,
patent and other federal laws against the states.
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, who wrote
the majority opinion, called Stevens' conclusion
"exaggerated," saying that other methods of
ensuring state compliance with federal law
remained.
William Van Alstyne, a Duke University law
professor who specializes in constitutional law, said
Congress could get around the ruling by revising
affected laws to authorize suits against state
officials rather than state governments.
"In a larger sense," he added, "this case certainly
is significant because it indicates the court majority
tends to take seriously the boundaries [of federal
power]."
...I afact, it was the second time in less than a year
that the court's most conservative members --
Rehnquist, Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia,
Anthony M. Kennedy and Clarence Thomas -- had
curbed the power of Congress over interstate
commerce.
Last April, in an identical 5-4 split, the justices
ruled that Congress had exceeded its authority by
barring anyone from carrying a gun near a school.
Taken together, the decisions signal a sharp
retreat from the court's longtime willingness to
endorse the expanding power of Congress to
regulate a vast array of commercial activities.
The decision issued Wednesday by Chief Justice
Rehnquist resolved a conflict between the U.S.
Indians Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 and a
little-known constitutional amendment that has been
a rallying cry for states-rights advocates.
The act requires states to negotiate "in good
faith" with the tribes over gambling on Indian lands
and authorizes the tribes to sue states that refuse to
do so. Many states reached agreements with tribes,
but Florida, Alabama, Washington, Oklahoma,
Kansas and Montana resisted.
"Congress could have done this without the
states," said Howard Dickstein, a Sacramento
lawyer representing California tribes. "By cutting
the states in, Congress ran into trouble."
The Seminole Tribe of Florida, which started
the Indian gambling boom by opening a high-stakes
bingo hall in 1979 on its reservation near
Hollywood, Fla., sued the state and its governor,
Lawton Chiles.
A federal appeals court upheld Florida's
contention that the suit was barred by the I Ith
Amendment, a ruling narrowly affirmed Wednesday
by the Supreme Court.
The amendment provides that "the judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit ... against one of the United
States" by citizens of another state or a foreign
country.
The Supreme Court has interpreted the
amendment to mean that each state is "a sovereign
entity" and cannot be sued by an individual unless
the state consents, usually by law.
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But historically, the court made two exceptions.
One exception, which stems from the 14th
Amendment and remains intact, allows individuals
to seek remedies in federal court against states that
allegedly violated their rights to life, liberty,
property and equal protection of the laws.
The second exception, announced by a more
liberal court in the 1989 case of Pennsylvania vs.
Union Gas Co., gave Congress the power to
override state sovereignty in commerce-based laws,
thus making the states susceptible to damages for.
disobeying such laws.
On Wednesday, Rehnquist obliterated the
commerce exception, reasserted the underlying
principle of state sovereignty and concluded "that
Union Gas was wrongly decided and that it should
be, and now is, overruled."
Even when Congress has complete law-making
authority over a subject, such as Indian commerce,
"the 11th Amendment prevents congressional
authorization of suits by private parties against
unconsenting states," Rehnquist said.
Responding to Justice Stevens, Rehnquist said
the court had not impaired the federal government's
authority to bring a suit in federal court against a
state, nor the right of an individual to sue a state
official instead of the state itself
(However, in the Indian gambling case,
Seminole Tribe vs. Florda, Rehnquist barred a suit
against Gov. Chiles because the Indian gaming law
has an unusual enforcement mechanism.)
"All pretty cold comfort," replied Justice David
H. Souter, who read from the bench excerpts of a
historically based dissent that ran 92 pages, three
times the length of the chief justice's majority
opinion.
. - "The majoritys position ignores the importance
of citizen-suits to enforcement of federal law,"
declared Souter, who was joined by Ruth Bader
Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer.
Stevens attacked the majority's allegiance to
sovereign immunity, an ancient English legal
doctrine based on a belief that "the king can do no
wrong." That belief "has always been absurd" and
has no place in a democratic society, he said.
William Van Alstyne, a Duke University law
professor who specializes in constitutional law, said
Congress could get around the ruling by revising
affected laws to authorize suits against state
officials rather than state governments.
"In a larger sense," he added, "this case certainly
is significant because it indicates the court majority
-tends to take seriously the boundaries [of federal
power]."
In fact, it was the second time in less than a year
that the court's most conservative members --
Rehnquist, Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia,
Anthony M. Kennedy and Clarence Thomas -- had
curbed the power of Congress over interstate
commerce.
Last April, in an identical 5-4 split, the justices
ruled that Congress had exceeded its authority by
barring anyone from carrying a gun near a school.
Taken together, the decisions signal a sharp
retreat from the court's longtime willingness to
endorse the expanding power of Congress to
regulate a vast array of commercial activities.
The decision issued Wednesday by Chief Justice
Rehnquist resolved a conflict between the U.S.
Indians Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 and a
little-known constitutional amendment that has been
a rallying cry for states-rights advocates.
The act requires states to negotiate "in good
faith" with the tribes over gambling on Indian lands
and authorizes the tribes to sue states that refuse to
do so. Many states reached agreements with tribes,
but Florida, Alabama, Washington, Oklahoma,
Kansas and Montana resisted.
"Congress could have done this without the
states," said Howard Dickstein, a Sacramento
lawyer representing California tribes. "By cutting
the states in, Congress ran into trouble."
Knight -Ridder Tribune Copyright 1996
325
AN ACCOUNTABILITY ISSUE
The New York Times
Monday, April 1, 1996
Nina Bernstein
To some proponents of states' rights, a major
Supreme Court ruling last week is a welcome
reinforcement of a long-term realignment in
American politics -- the states' reclaiming of
authority from a Federal Government grown too big
and too intrusive.
But the bitterly contested decision, in a
gambling dispute in Florida, raises the specter of a
system in which states can use enhanced sovereignty
to avoid accountability.
Many Federal laws on the environment,
business, health and safety now have provisions that
allow people hurt by violations of those laws to sue
in Federal court. But the new decision, in Seminole
Tribe v. Florida, says states are immune from such
suits and holds that Congress is powerless to
authorize them.
The decision means that even as political power
shifts from the Federal Government to the states
through block grants, waivers and a retreat from
Federal regulation, states will be less accountable to
people who believe they are the victims of
government wrongdoing in matters like water
pollution, health care and copyright infringement.
"This is a case about power," Associate Justice
John Paul Stevens wrote in his dissent from the
5-to-4 majority decision. The importance of the
Court's decision, he declared, "cannot be
overstated."
Few cases could seem less relevant to the
everyday life of most people than a Seminole tribe's
dispute with Florida officials over casinos. But the
Supreme Court's decision has turned that obscure
suit and a dusty amendment into the stuff of
historical watersheds.
The decision came in a case challenging a 1988
law that permits Indian tribes to sue states in
Federal court for failing to negotiate in good faith
over gambling operations on tribal land. In an
opinion by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the
Court ruled that this portion of the law was an
unconstitutional incursion on state sovereignty.
The ruling raises much broader questions about
whether individuals can use the courts to force states
to abide by a variety of Federal laws.
"It's very similar to what happened in the 1880's
and 1890's," said Eric Foner, the American historian
whose book on Reconstruction is cited in the long
and passionate dissent by Associate Justice David
H. Souter. "You had a series of Supreme Court
decisions which little by little retreated from the
broad definition of Federal power which had been
written into the laws and Constitution during
Reconstruction."
Civil liberties lawyers are quick to point out that
the decision's immediate effects are limited. It leaves
intact the individual's right to sue states in Federal
court for violations of civil rights statutes under the
umbrella of the 14th Amendment, which includes
the decree that states cannot "deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
And it leaves open other legal mechanisms for
challenging state actions in areas not covered by the
14th Amendment. But many of those mechanisms
are now in a kind of political meltdown.
Congress, for example, can still attach
conditions to the receipt of Federal money, including
a requirement that states waive their immunity from
private lawsuits in state courts if they accept the
money. But as governors clamor for block grants,
President Clinton has granted waivers of Federal
welfare rules to more than half the states.
Similarly, the Federal Government can still
enforce environmental or occupational safety laws
through its regulatory agents, and can sue states in
Federal court for failing to enforce those laws. But
the Republican Congress has made cutting back on
regulations one of its major goals.
"What's happening in the Supreme Court
dovetails nicely with what's happening in the 104th
Congress," Timothy Lynch, a constitutional scholar
at the conservative Cato Institute, said. "If Robert
Dole wins the White House," he added, "this trend
is going to accelerate."
Laurence H. Tribe, a professor of law at
Harvard University, said the reason a wide range of
Federal laws included an individual right to sue in
Federal court was that Congress wanted to put a
right of enforcement action directly into the hands of
the most affected parties. The new ruling, though,
puts the states off limits for such Federal litigation.
An individual would now seem to be barred
from suing a state university under Federal
copyright laws if for example, the university pirated
his computer software, said David Strauss, a
professor of law at the University of Chicago. A
private business apparently could not collect
damages from a state-run health maintenance
organization that violated Federal
truth-in-advertising laws, he said.
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As states compete for industry, create
public-private partnerships and privatize functions
like prisons, the Supreme Court decision in the
Florida case takes on wider significance. Its scope
can be determined only through future litigation.
One lawyer who argued a case that was
overturned in the new ruling sees major problems in
the environmental arena.
"What this means specifically for environmental
sites is that the states can ignore their environmental
obligations while other parties go bankrupt cleaning
up," said Robert A. Swift, who successfully argued
against state immunity before a different set of
Supreme Court Justices in Pennsylvania v. Union
Gas in 1989, representing Union Gas.
In that water pollution case, the state had
relocated a stream near an old gas plant, releasing a
dormant deposit of coal tar. Pennsylvania, sued for
part of the cleanup cost under the law known as
Superfund, claimed immunity under the 11th
Amendment, which protects states against certain
suits, but lost and paid $400,000. An opposite result
would have flowed from last week's decision, which
pointedly overruled the Court's 5-to-4 holding in
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas.
John Knorr, Chief Deputy Attorney General for
Pennsylvania, praised last week's decision, saying it
"frees the states to be accountable to their own
people for deciding what is a fair scheme, rather
than being accountable to the courts."
But Professor Foner, the Dewitt Clinton
Professor of American History at Columbia
University, said that in the past, an open courthouse
door has been crucial to keeping states accountable.
After the Civil War, when the national Government
was relatively weak and small - it lacked even a
Justice Department until 1870 - the major
mechanism for establishing the Federal supremacy
won by the Union Army was to let private citizens
bring suits in Federal courts. Those courts went
through a tremendous expansion.
But then, in 1877, a disputed Presidential
election was resolved with a deal that traded
Southern support for Rutherford B. Hayes for the
promise not to intervene in the South anymore. The
door was closed on Reconstruction, and opened,
over the next generation, to Jim Crow laws, the
reign of the Ku Klux Klan, and the
disenfranchisement of black voters.
That was the political context in which the I Ith
Amendment was first interpreted as a general bar to
citizens' suits against states in Federal court, in
Hans v. Louisiana. That 1890 decision, given new
life by the Court last week, was made "in the midst
of ome of the darkest periods of Supreme Court
history in terms of its complete abdication of its role
in protecting the rights of American citizens,"
Professor Foner said.
The I Ith Amendment bars Federal courts from
hearing cases in which one state is sued by citizens
of another state or country. It was written to
invalidate an early Supreme Court decision favoring
a suit by South Carolinians representing British
banking interests. The plaintiffs were trying to
collect a Revolutionary War debt from Georgia.
Professor Tribe called Justice Rehnquist's
majority opinion a "radical departure from the
language of the 11th Amendment and the
arhitectural frame of the Constitution as a whole."
He added that in light of an earlier ruling that
Congress lacked authority to ban possession of guns
near schools, "the Court's current dedication to a
states' rights doctrine seems to be a rather
free-floating cloud that can rain on almost any
source of Congressional power."
David Vladeck of the nonprofit consumer
organization Public Citizen said that if the lower
courts followed the decision strictly, it would be
very difficult to enforce a wide range of statutes
against the states. But he said he was confident
alternatives would emerge.
"One of the reasons the doctrines of sovereign
immunity have eroded over time," he said, "is that it
is very difficult for a political body to tell citizens
repeatedly that they have no redress when the
government commits, time and again, an egregious
wrong."
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SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA, PETITIONER
V.
FLORIDA ET AL.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
116 S. Ct. 1114
March 27, 1996, Decided
... CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court...
I
Congress passed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act in 1988 in order to provide a statutory basis for the
operation and regulation of gaming by Indian tribes. The Act divides gaming on Indian lands into three
classes... and provides a different regulatory scheme for each class. Class III gaming--the type with which
we are here concerned ... includes such things as slot machines, casino games, banking card games, dog
racing, and lotteries. It is the most heavily regulated of the three classes. The Act provides that class III
gaming is lawful only where it is: (1) authorized by an ordinance or resolution that (a) is adopted by the
governing body of the Indian tribe, (b) satisfies certain statutorily prescribed requirements, and (c) is
approved by the National Indian Gaming Commission; (2) located in a State that permits such gaming for
any purpose by any person, organization, or entity; and (3) "conducted in conformance with a Tribal-State
compact entered into by the Indian tribe and the State under paragraph (3) that is in effect."
The "paragraph (3)" to which the last prerequisite of § 2710(d)(1) refers is § 2710(d)(3), which describes
the permissible scope of a Tribal-State compact and provides that the compact is effective "only when notice
of approval by the Secretary [of the Interior] of such compact has been published by the Secretary in the
Federal Register," § 2710(dX3)(B). More significant for our purposes, however, is that § 2710(d)(3)
describes the process by which a State and an Indian tribe begin negotiations toward a Tribal-State compact:
"(A) Any Indian tribe having jurisdiction over the Indian lands upon which a class III gaming activity is being
conducted, or is to be conducted, shall request the State in which such lands are located to enter into
negotiations for the purpose of entering into a Tribal-State compact governing the conduct of gaming
activities. Upon receiving such a request, the State shall negotiate with the Indian tribe in good faith to enter
into such a compact."
The State's obligation to "negotiate with the Indian tribe in good faith," is made judicially enforceable
by §§ 2710(dX7XA)(i) and (BXi): "(A) The United States district courts shall have jurisdiction over-- "(i)
any cause of action initiated by an Indian tribe arising from the failure of a State to enter into negotiations
with the Indian tribe for the purpose of entering into a Tribal-State compact under paragraph (3) or to
conduct such negotiations in good faith . . . "(B)(i) An Indian tribe may initiate a cause of action described
in subparagraph (AXi) only after the close of the 180-day period beginning on the date on which the Indian
tribe requested the State to enter into negotiations under paragraph (3)(A)."
Sections 2710(dX7XB)(ii)-(vii) describe an elaborate remedial scheme designed to ensure the formation
of a Tribal-State compact. A tribe that brings an action under § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i) must show that no
Tribal-State compact has been entered and that the State failed to respond in good faith to the tribe's request
to negotiate; at that point, the burden then shifts to the State to prove that it did in fact negotiate in good
faith. If the district court concludes that the State has failed to negotiate in good faith toward the formation
of a Tribal-State compact, then it "shall order the State and Indian tribe to conclude such a compact within
a 60-day period." If no compact has been concluded 60 days after the court's order, then "the Indian tribe
and the State shall each submit to a mediator appointed by the court a proposed compact that represents their
last best offer for a compact." The mediator chooses from between the two proposed compacts the one
"which best conports with the terms of [the Act] and any other applicable Federal law and with the findings
and order of the court," and submits it to the State and the Indian tribe. If the State consents to the proposed
compact within 60 days of its submission by the mediator, then the proposed compact is "treated as a
Tribal-State compact entered into under paragraph (3)."If, however, the State does not consent within that
60-day period, then the Act provides that the mediator "shall notify the Secretary [of the Interior]" and that
the Secretary "shall prescribe .. . procedures ... under which class I gaming may be conducted on the
Indian lands over which the Indian tribe has jurisdiction."
In September 1991, the Seminole Tribe of Indians, petitioner, sued the State of Florida and its Governor,
Lawton Chiles, respondents. . . .[P]etitioner alleged that respondents had "refused to enter into any
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negotiation for inclusion of [certain gaming activities] in a tribal-state compact," thereby violating the
"requirement of good faith negotiation". . . Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the
suit violated the State's sovereign immunity from suit in federal court. The District Court denied respondents'
motion, and the respondents took an interlocutory appeal of that decision.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the decision of the District Court, holding that
the Eleventh Amendment barred petitioner's suit against respondents. The court agreed with the District
Court that Congress in § 2710(d)(7) intended to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity, and also agreed
that the Act had been passed pursuant to Congress' power under the Indian Commerce Clause. The court
disagreed with the District Court, however, that the Indian Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to
abrogate a State's Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit, and concluded therefore that it had no
jurisdiction over petitioner's suit against Florida. The court further held that Ex parte Young does not permit
an Indian tribe to force good faith negotiations by suing the Governor of a State. Finding that it lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction, the Eleventh Circuit remanded to the District Court with directions to dismiss
petitioner's suit.
Petitioner sought our review of the Eleventh Circuit's decision, and we granted certiorari in order to
consider two questions: (1) Does the Eleventh Amendment prevent Congress from authorizing suits by Indian
tribes against States for prospective injunctive relief to enforce legislation enacted pursuant to the Indian
Commerce Clause?; and (2) Does the doctrine of Exparte Young permit suits against a State's governor for
prospective injunctive relief to enforce the good faith bargaining requirement of the Act? We answer the first
question in the affirmative, the second in the negative, and we therefore affirm the Eleventh Circuit's
dismissal of petitioner's suit.
The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens
of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." Although the text of the Amendment
would appear to restrict only the Article II diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, "we have understood
the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition . . . which it
confirms." That presupposition... has two parts: first, that each State is a sovereign entity in our federal
system; and second, that 'it is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an
individual without its consent."'
Here, petitioner has sued the State of Florida and it is undisputed that Florida has not consented to the
suit. Petitioner nevertheless contends that its suit is not barred by state sovereign immunity. First, it argues
that Congress through the Act abrogated the States' sovereign immunity. Alternatively, petitioner maintains
that its suit against the Governor may go forward under Ex parte Young. We consider each of those
arguments in turn.
II
Petitioner argues that Congress through the Act abrogated the States' immunity from suit. In order to
determine whether Congress has abrogated the States' sovereign immunity, we ask two questions: first,
whether Congress has "unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate the immunity"; and second, whether
Congress has acted "pursuant to a valid exercise of power."
A
Congress' intent to abrogate the States' immunity from suit must be obvious from "a clear legislative
statement". . . .
Here, we agree with the parties, with the Eleventh Circuit in the decision below, and with virtually every
other court that has confronted the question that Congress has in § 271 O(d)(7) provided an "unmistakably
clear" statement of its intent to abrogate. Section 2710(dX7XAXi) vests jurisdiction in "the United States
district courts .. .over any cause of action... arising from the failure of a State to enter into negotiations. . .
or to conduct such negotiations in good faith." Any conceivable doubt as to the identity of the defendant in
an action under § 2710(dX7)(AXi) is dispelled when one looks to the various provisions of § 2710(d)(7)(B),
which describe the remedial scheme available to a tribe that files suit under § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i). Section
2710(dX7)(B)(ii)(II) provides that if a suing tribe meets its burden of proof, then the "burden of proof shall
be upon the State . . . ."; § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii) states that if the court "finds that the State has failed to
negotiate in good faith.. . . the court shall order the State. . ."; § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv) provides that "the State
shall... submit [to a mediator appointed by the court" and subsection (B)(v) of § 27 1O(d)(7) states that the
mediator "shall submit to the State." Sections 2710(d)(7)(BXvi) and (vii) also refer to the "State" in a context
that makes it clear that the State is the defendant to the suit brought by an Indian tribe under
§ 2710(d)(7)(A)(i). In sum, we think that the numerous references to the "State" in the text of
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§ 2710(d)(7)(B) make it indubitable that Congress intended through the Act to abrogate the States' sovereign
immunity from suit.
B
Having concluded that Congress clearly intended to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity through
§ 2710(d)(7), we turn now to consider whether the Act was passed "pursuant to a valid exercise of power."
Before we address that question here, however, we think it necessary first to define the scope of our inquiry.
Petitioner suggests that one consideration weighing in favor of finding the power to abrogate here is that
the Act authorizes only prospective injunctive relief rather than retroactive monetary relief. But we have often
made it clear that the relief sought by a plaintiff suing a State is irrelevant to the question whether the suit
is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment does not exist solely in order to "prevent
federal court judgments that must be paid out of a State's treasury"; it also serves to avoid "the indignity of
subjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties."
Similarly, petitioner argues that the abrogation power is validly exercised here because the Act grants
the States a power that they would not otherwise have some measure of authority over gaming on Indian
lands. It is true enough that the Act extends to the States a power withheld from them by the Constitution.
Nevertheless, we do not see how that consideration is relevant to the question whether Congress may
abrogate state sovereign immunity. The Eleventh Amendment immunity may not be lifted by Congress
unilaterally deciding that it will be replaced by grant of some other authority.
Thus our inquiry into whether Congress has the power to abrogate unilaterally the States' immunity from
suit is narrowly focused on one question: Was the Act in question passed pursuant to a constitutional
provision granting Congress the power to abrogate? Previously, in conducting that inquiry, we have found
authority to abrogate under only two provisions of the Constitution.. . .We held that through the Fourteenth
Amendment, federal power extended to intrude upon the province of the Eleventh Amendment and therefore
that § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment allowed Congress to abrogate the immunity from suit guaranteed by
that Amendment.
... In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., a plurality of the Court found that the Interstate Commerce
Clause granted Congress the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity....
In arguing that Congress through the Act abrogated the States' sovereign immunity, petitioner does not
challenge the Eleventh Circuit's conclusion that the Act was passed pursuant to neither the Fourteenth
Amendment nor the Interstate Commerce Clause. Instead, accepting the lower court's conclusion that the Act
was passed pursuant to Congress' power under the Indian Commerce Clause, petitioner now asks us to
consider whether that clause grants Congress the power to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity.
Both parties make their arguments from the plurality decision in Union Gas, and we, too, begin there.
We think it clear that Justice Brennan's opinion finds Congress' power to abrogate under the Interstate
Commerce Clause from the States' cession of their sovereignty when they gave Congress plenary power to
regulate interstate commerce.... While the plurality decision states that Congress' power under the Interstate
Commerce Clause would be incomplete without the power to abrogate, that statement is made solely in order
to emphasize the broad scope of Congress' authority over interstate commerce.
Following the rationale of the Union Gas plurality, our inquiry is limited to determining whether the
Indian Commerce Clause, like the Interstate Commerce Clause, is a grant of authority to the Federal
Government at the expense of the States.... If anything, the Indian Commerce Clause accomplishes a greater
transfer of power from the States to the Federal Government than does the Interstate Commerce Clause. This
is clear enough from the fact that the States still exercise some authority over interstate trade but have been
divested of virtually all authority over Indian commerce and Indian tribes. Under the rationale of Union Gas,
if the States' partial cession of authority over a particular area includes cession of the immunity from suit,
then their virtually total cession of authority over a different area must also include cession of the immunity
from suit. We agree with the petitioner that the plurality opinion in Union Gas allows no principled
distinction in favor of the States to be drawn between the Indian Commerce Clause and the Interstate
Commerce Clause.
Respondents argue, however, that we need not conclude that the Indian Commerce Clause grants the
power to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity. Instead, they contend that if we find the rationale of the
Union Gas plurality to extend to the Indian Commerce Clause, then "Union Gas should be reconsidered and
overruled.". . . Our willingness to reconsider our earlier decisions has been "particularly true in constitutional
cases, because in such cases 'correction through legislative action is practically impossible"'. . . .
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In the five years since it was decided, Union Gas has proven to be a solitary departure from established
law. Reconsidering the decision in Union Gas, we conclude that none of the policies underlying stare decisis
require our continuing adherence to its holding. The decision has, since its issuance, been of questionable
precedential value, largely because a majority of the Court expressly disagreed with the rationale of the
plurality.
The case involved the interpretation of the Constitution and therefore may be altered only by
constitutional amendment or revision by this Court. Finally, both the result in Union Gas and the plurality's
rationale depart from our established understanding of the Eleventh Amendment and undermine the accepted
function of Article IU. We feel bound to conclude that Union Gas was wrongly decided and that it should
be, and now is, overruled.
.. We adhere in thiscase, however, not to mere obiter dicta, but rather to the well-established rationale
upon which the Court based the results of its earlier decisions. . . . For over a century, we have grounded our
decisions in the oft-repeated understanding of state sovereign immunity as an essential part of the Eleventh
Amendment....
... It is true that we have not had occasion previously to apply established Eleventh Amendment
principles to the question whether Congress has the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity (save in
Union Gas). But consideration of that question must proceed with fidelity to this century-old doctrine....
In overruling Union Gas today, we reconfirm that the background principle of state sovereign immunity
embodied in the Eleventh Amendment is not so ephemeral as to dissipate when the subject of the suit is an
area, like the regulation of Indian commerce, that is under the exclusive control of the Federal Government.
Even when the Constitution vests in Congress complete law-making authority over a particular area, the
Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits by private parties against unconsenting
States. The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used
to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction. Petitioner's suit against the State
of Florida must be dismissed for a lack of jurisdiction.
II
Petitioner argues that we may exercise jurisdiction over its suit to enforce § 271 0(d)(3) against the
Governor notwithstanding the jurisdictional bar of the Eleventh Amendment. Petitioner notes that since our
decision in Exparte Young, we often have found federal jurisdiction over a suit against a state official when
that suit seeks only prospective injunctive relief in order to "end a continuing violation of federal law." The
situation presented here, however, is sufficiently different from that giving rise to the traditional Exparte
Young action so as to preclude the availability of that doctrine.
Here, the "continuing violation of federal law" alleged by petitioner is the Governor's failure to bring the
State into compliance with § 271 O(d)(3). But the duty to negotiate imposed upon the State by that statutory
provision does not stand alone. Rather, as we have seen, Congress passed § 2710(d)(3) in conjunction with
the carefully crafted and intricate remedial scheme set forth in § 2710(d)(7).
Where Congress has created a remedial scheme for the enforcement of a particular federal right, we
have, in suits against federal officers, refused to supplement that scheme with one created by the judiciary.
Here, of course, the question is not whether a remedy should be created, but instead is whether the Eleventh
Amendment bar should be lifted, as it was in Exparte Young, in order to allow a suit against a state officer.
Nevertheless, we think that the same general principle applies: therefore, where Congress has prescribed a
detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement against a State of a statutorily created right, a court should
hesitate before casting aside those limitations and permitting an action against a state officer based upon Ex
parte Young.
Here, Congress intended § 2710(d)(3) to be enforced against the State in an action brought under
§27 10(d)(7); the intricate procedures set forth in that provision show that Congress intended therein not only
to define, but also significantly to limit, the duty imposed by § 2710(d)(3).. . .
Here, of course, we have found that Congress does not have authority under the Constitution to make
the State suable in federal court under § 2710(d)(7). Nevertheless, the fact that Congress chose to impose
upon the State a liability which is significantly more limited than would be the liability imposed upon the
state officer under Ex parte Young strongly indicates that Congress had no wish to create the latter under
§ 2710(d)(3). Nor are we free to rewrite the statutory scheme in order to approximate what we think
Congress might have wanted had it known that § 2710(d)(7) was beyond its authority. If that effort is to be
made, it should be made by Congress, and not by the federal courts. We hold that Er parte Young is
inapplicable to petitioner's suit against the Governor of Florida, and therefore that suit is barred by the
Eleventh Amendment and must be dismissed for a lack of jurisdiction.
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IV
The Eleventh Amendment prohibits Congress from making the State of Florida capable of being sued
in federal court. The narrow exception to the Eleventh Amendment provided by the Exparte Young doctrine
cannot be used to enforce § 271 O(d)(3) because Congress enacted a remedial scheme specifically designed
for the enforcement of that right. The Eleventh Circuit's dismissal of petitioner's suit is hereby affirmed.
It is so ordered.
... JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
This case is about power-the power of the Congress of the United States to create a private federal cause
of action against a State, or its Governor, for the violation of a federal right.... [In a sharp break with the
past, today the Court holds that with the narrow and illogical exception of statutes enacted pursuant to the
Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress has no such power.
The importance of the majoritys decision to overrule the Court's holding in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
Co. cannot be overstated. The majority's opinion does not simply preclude Congress from establishing the
rather curious statutory scheme under which Indian tribes may seek the aid of a federal court to secure a
State's good faith negotiations over gaming regulations. Rather, it prevents Congress from providing a federal
forum for a broad range of actions against States, from those sounding in copyright and patent law, to those
concerning bankruptcy, environmental law, and the regulation of our vast national economy.
There may be room for debate over whether, in light of the Eleventh Amendment, Congress has the
power to ensure that such a cause of action may be enforced in federal court by a citizen of another State or
a foreign citizen. There can be no serious debate, however, over whether Congress has the power to ensure
that such a cause of action may be brought by a citizen of the State being sued. Congress' authority in that
regard is clear.
.. T]he Court's contrary conclusion is profoundly misguided. Despite the thoroughness of his analysis,
supported by sound reason, history, precedent, and strikingly uniform scholarly commentary, the shocking
character of the majority's affront to a coequal branch of our Government merits additional comment.
I
For the purpose of deciding this case, I can readily assume that Justice Iredell's dissent in Chisholm v.
Georgia and the Court's opinion in Hans v. Louisiana correctly stated the law that should govern our
decision today. As I shall explain, both of those opinions relied on an interpretation of an Act of Congress
rather than a want of congressional power to authorize a suit against the State.
In concluding that the federal courts could not entertain Chisholm's action against the State of Georgia,
Justice Iredell relied on the text of the Judiciary Act of 1789, not the State's assertion that Article III did not
extend the judicial power to suits against unconsenting States. Justice Iredell argued that, under Article m,
federal courts possessed only such jurisdiction as Congress had provided, and that the Judiciary Act expressly
limited federal-court jurisdiction to that which could be exercised in accordance with "'the principles and
usages of law."' He reasoned that the inclusion of this phrase constituted a command to the federal courts to
construe their jurisdiction in light of the prevailing common law, a background legal regime which he
believed incorporated the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Because Justice Iredell believed that the expansive text of Article III did not prevent Congress from
imposing this common-law limitation on federal-court jurisdiction, he concluded that judges had no authority
to entertain a suit against an unconsenting State. At the same time, although he acknowledged that the
Constitution might allow Congress to extend federal-court jurisdiction to such an action, he concluded that
the terms of the Judiciary Act of 1789 plainly had not done so....
For Justice Iredell then, it was enough to assume that Article III permitted Congress to impose sovereign
immunity as a jurisdictional limitation; he did not proceed to resolve the further question whether the
Constitution went so far as to prevent Congress from withdrawing a State's immunity. Thus, it would be
ironic to construe the Chisholm dissent as precedent for the conclusion that Article Ill limits Congress' power
to determine the scope of a State's sovereign immunity in federal court.
The precise holding in Chisholm is difficult to state because each of the Justices in the majority wrote
his own opinion. They seem to have held, however, not that the Judiciary Act of 1789 precluded the defense
of sovereign immunity, but that Article M of the Constitution itself required the Supreme Court to entertain
original actions against unconsenting States. I agree with Justice Iredell that such a construction of Article
M is incorrect, that Article should not then have been construed, and should not now be construed, to prevent
Congress from granting States a sovereign immunity defense in such cases. That reading of Article m,
however, explains why the majority's holding in Chisholm could not have been reversed by a simple statutory
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amendment adopting Justice Iredell's interpretation of the Judiciary Act of 1789. There is a special irony in
the fact that the error committed by the Chisholm majority was its decision that this Court, rather than
Congress, should define the scope of the sovereign immunity defense. That, of course, is precisely the same
error the Court commits today.
In light of the nature of the disagreement between Justice Iredell and his colleagues, Chisholm's holding
could have been overturned by simply amending the Constitution to restore to Congress the authority to
recognize the doctrine. As it was, the plain text of the Eleventh Amendment would seem to go further and
to limit the judicial power itself in a certain class of cases. In doing so, however, the Amendment's quite
explicit text establishes only a partial bar to a federal court's power to entertain a suit against a State....
. .. Whatever the precise dimensions of the [11th] Amendment, its express terms plainly do not apply
to all suits brought against unconsenting States; The question thus becomes whether the relatively modest
jurisdictional bar that the Eleventh Amendment imposes should be understood to reveal that a more general
jurisdictional bar implicitly inheres in Article IUl.
The language of Article m certainly gives no indication that such an implicit bar exists. That provision's
text specifically provides for federal-court jurisdiction over all cases arising under federal law ... .Justice
Iredell's analysis at least suggests that it was by no means a fixed view at the time of the founding that Article
III prevented Congress from rendering States suable in federal court by their own citizens. In sum, little more
than speculation justifies the conclusion that the Eleventh Amendment's express but partial limitation on the
scope of Article Ill reveals that an implicit but more general one was already in place.
II
. . The reasons that may support a federal court's hesitancy to construe a judicially crafted constitutional
remedy narrowly out of respect for a State's sovereignty do not bear on whether Congress may preclude a
State's invocation of such a defense when it expressly establishes a federal remedy for the violation of a
federal right.
No one has ever suggested that Congress would be powerless to displace the other common-law
immunity doctrines that this Court has recognized as appropriate defenses to certain federal claims. . .
Similarly, our cases recognizing qualified officer immunity in § 1983 actions rest on the conclusion that, in
passing that statute, Congress did not intend to displace the common-law immunity that officers would have
retained under suits premised solely on the general jurisdictional statute. For that reason, the federal common
law of officer immunity that Congress meant to incorporate, not a contrary state immunity, applies in § 1983
cases. There is no reason why Congress' undoubted power to displace those common-law immunities should
be either greater or lesser than its power to displace the common-law sovereign immunity defense....
The view that the rule ofHans is more substantive than jurisdictional comports with Hamilton's famous
discussion of sovereign immunity in The Federalist Papers. Hamilton offered his view that the federal
judicial power would not extend to suits against unconsenting States only in the context of his contention that
no contract with a State could be enforceable against the State's desire. He did not argue that a State's
immunity from suit in federal court would be absolute....
He ... no question of a State's contractual obligations is presented. The Seminole Tribe's only claim
is that the State of Florida has failed to fulfill a duty to negotiate that federal statutory law alone imposes.
Neither the Federalist Papers, nor Hans, provides support for the view that such a claim may not be heard
in federal court.
Ill
In reaching my conclusion that the Constitution does not prevent Congress from making the State of
Florida suable in federal court for violating one of its statutes, I emphasize that I agree with the majority that
in all cases to which the judicial power does not extend--either because they are not within any category
defined in Article III or because they are within the category withdrawn from Article III by the Eleventh
Amendment--Congress lacks the power to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts.
It was, therefore, misleading for the Court in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer to imply that § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment authorized Congress to confer jurisdiction over cases that had been withdrawn from Article m
by the Eleventh Amendment....
In confronting the question whether a federal grant ofjurisdiction is within the scope of Article I, as
limited by the Eleventh Amendment, I see no reason to distinguish among statutes enacted pursuant to the
power granted to Congress to regulate Commerce among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes, the
power to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy, the power to promote the progress of science
and the arts by granting exclusive rights to authors and inventors, the power to enforce the provisions of the
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Fourteenth Amendment, § 5, or indeed any other provision of the Constitution. There is no language
anywhere in the constitutional text that authorizes Congress to expand the borders of Article Ill jurisdiction
or to limit the coverage of the Eleventh Amendment.
The Court's holdings in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, and Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. do unquestionably
establish, however, that Congress has the power to deny the States and their officials the right to rely on the
nonconstitutional defense of sovereign immunity in an action brought by one of their own citizens. As the
opinions in the latter case demonstrate, there can be legitimate disagreement about whether Congress
intended a particular statute to authorize litigation against a State. Nevertheless, the Court there squarely held
that the Commerce Clause was an adequate source of authority for such a private remedy. In a rather novel
rejection of the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court today demeans that holding by repeatedly describing it as
a "plurality decision"- because Justice White did not deem it necessary to set forth the reasons for his
vote. .. .[T]he arguments in support of Justice White's position are so patent and so powerful that his actual
vote should be accorded full respect. Indeed, far more significant than the "plurality" character of the three
opinions supporting the holding in Union Gas is the fact that the issue confronted today has been squarely
addressed by a total of 13 Justices, 8 of whom cast their votes with the so-called "plurality".
The fundamental error that continues to lead the Court astray is its failure to acknowledge that its modern
embodiment of the ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity "has absolutely nothing to do with the limit on
judicial power contained in the Eleventh Amendment." It rests rather on concerns of federalism and comity
that merit respect but are nevertheless, in cases such as the one before us, subordinate to the plenary power
of Congress.
... For these reasons, as well as those set forth in JUSTICE SOUTER's opinion, I respectfully dissent.
JUSTICE SOUTER, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG and JUSTICE BREYER join, dissenting.
In holding the State of Florida immune to suit under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, the Court today
holds for the first time since the founding of the Republic that Congress has no authority to subject a State
to the jurisdiction of a federal court at the behest of an individual asserting a federal right. Although the Court
invokes the Eleventh Amendment as authority for this proposition, the only sense in which that amendment
might be claimed as pertinent here was tolerantly phrased by JUSTICE STEVENS in his concurring opinion
in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas.
There, he explained how it has come about that we have two Eleventh Amendments, the one ratified in
1795, the other (so-called) invented by the Court nearly a century later in Hans v. Louisiana. JUSTICE
STEVENS saw in that second Eleventh Amendment no bar to the exercise of congressional authority under
the Commerce Clause in providing for suits on a federal question by individuals against a State, and I can
only say that after my own canvass of the matter I believe he was entirely correct in that view. ...
... I part company from the Court because I am convinced that its decision is fundamentally mistaken,
and for that reason I respectfully dissent.
I
It is useful to separate three questions: (1) whether the States enjoyed sovereign immunity if sued in their
own courts in the peiod prior to ratification of the National Constitution; (2) if so, whether after ratification
the States were entitled to claim some such immunity when sued in a federal court exercising jurisdiction
either because the suit was between a State and a non-state litigant who was not its citizen, or because the
issue in the case raised a federal question, and (3) whether any state sovereign immunity recognized in federal
court may be abrogated by Congress.
The answer to the first question is not clear, although some of the Framers assumed that States did enjoy
immunity in their own courts. The second question was not debated at the time of ratification, except as to
citizen-state diversity jurisdiction; there was no unanimity, but in due course the Court in Chisholm v.
Georgia answered that a state defendant enjoyed no such immunity. As to federal question jurisdiction, state
sovereign immunity seems not to have been debated prior to ratification, the silence probably showing a
general understanding at the time that the States would have no immunity in such cases.
The adoption of the Eleventh Amendment soon changed the result in Chisholm, not by mentioning
sovereign immunity, but by eliminating citizen-state diversity jurisdiction over cases with state
defendants. ...
The Court's answer today to the third question is likewise at odds with the Founders' view that common
law, when it was received into the new American legal systems, was always subject to legislative
amendment. In ignoring the reasons for this pervasive understanding at the time of the ratification, and in
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holding that a nontextual common-law rule limits a clear grant of congressional power under Article I, the
Court follows a course that has brought it to grief before in our history, and promises to do so again.
. .[T]here is one further issue. To reach the Court's result, it must not only hold the Hans doctrine to
be outside the reach of Congress, but must also displace the doctrine ofEr parte Young, that an officer of
the government may be ordered prospectively to follow federal law, in cases in which the government may
not itself be sued directly. None of its reasons for displacing Young's jurisdictional doctrine withstand
scrutiny.
A
The doctrine of sovereign immunity comprises two distinct rules. . . The one rule holds that the King or
the Crown... is not bound by the laws provisions; the other provides that the King or Crown, as the font of
justice, is not subject to suit in its own courts. The one rule limits the reach of substantive law; the other, the
jurisdiction of the courts. We are concerned here only with the latter rule....
The Eleventh Amendment... clearly divested federal courts of some jurisdiction as to cases against state
parties: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State." There are two plausible readings of this provision's text. Under the first, it
simply repeals the Citizen-State Diversity Clauses of Article l for all cases in which the State appears as
a defendant. Under the second, it strips the federal courts ofjurisdiction in any case in which a state defendant
is sued by a citizen not its own, even if jurisdiction might otherwise rest on the existence of a federal question
in the suit Neither reading of the Amendment, of course, furnishes authority for the Court's view in today's
case, but we need to choose between the competing readings for the light that will be shed on the Hans
doctrine and the legitimacy of inflating that doctrine to the point of constitutional immutability as the Court
has chosen to do....
In sum, reading the Eleventh Amendment solely as a limit on citizen-state diversity jurisdiction has the
virtue of coherence with this Court's practice, with the views of John Marshall, with the history of the
Amendments drafting, and with its allusive language. Today's majority does not appear to disagree, at least
insofar as the constitutional text is concerned; the Court concedes, after all, that "the text of the Amendment
would appear to restrict only the Article III diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts."
Thus, regardless of which of the two plausible readings one adopts, the further point to note here is that
there is no possible argument that the Eleventh Amendment, by its terms, deprives federal courts of
jurisdiction over all citizen lawsuits against the States. Not even the Court advances that proposition, and
there would be no textual basis for doing so. Because the plaintiffs in today's case are citizens of the State
that they are suing, the Eleventh Amendment simply does not apply to them. We must therefore look
elsewhere for the source of that immunity by which the Court says their suit is barred from a federal court. ...
Three critical errors in Hans weigh against constitutionalizing its holding as the majority does today. The
first . . . : the Hans Court misread the Eleventh Amendment. It also misunderstood the conditions under
which common-law doctrines were received or rejected at the time of the Founding, and it fundamentally
mistook the very nature of sovereignty in the young Republic that was supposed to entail a State's immunity
to federal question jurisdiction in a federal court....
Given the Framers' general concern with curbing abuses by state governments, it would be amazing if
the scheme of delegated powers embodied in the Constitution had left the National Government powerless
to render the States judicially accountable for violations of federal rights. ...
Today's majority discounts this concern. Without citing a single source to the contrary, the Court
dismisses the historical evidence regarding the Framers' vision of the relationship between national and state
sovereignty, and reassures us that "the Nation survived for nearly two centuries without the question of the
existence of [the abrogation] power ever being presented to this Court." But we are concerned here not with
the survival of the Nation but the opportunity of its citizens to enforce federal rights in a way that Congress
provides. The absence of any general federal question statute for nearly a century following ratification of
Article III (with a brief exception in 1800) hardly counts against the importance of that jurisdiction either in
the Framers' conception or in current reality; likewise, the fact that Congress has not often seen fit to use its
power of abrogation (outside the Fourteenth Amendment context, at least) does not compel a conclusion that
the power is not important to the federal scheme....
The Court's holding that the States' Hans immunity may not be abrogated by Congress leads to the final
question in this case, whether federal question jurisdiction exists to order prospective relief enforcing IGRA
against a state officer, respondent Chiles, who is said to be authorized to take the action required by the
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federal law. Just as with the issue about authority to order the State as such, this question is entirely
jurisdictional...
A
In Exparte Young, this Court held that a federal court has jurisdiction in a suit against a state officer to
enjoin official actions violating federal law, even though the State itself may be immune....
The fact, without more, that such suits may have a significant impact on state governments does not
count under Young.... Indeed, in the years since Young was decided, the Court has recognized only one
limitation on the scope of its doctrine: under Edelman v. Jordan, Young permits prospective relief only and
may not be applied to authorize suits for retrospective monetary relief.
It should be no cause for surprise that Young itself appeared when it did in the national law. It followed
as a matter of course after the Hans Court's broad recognition of immunity in federal question cases, simply
because "remedies designed to end a continuing violation of federal law are necessary to vindicate the federal
interest in assuring the supremacy of that law." Young provided, as it does today, a sensible way to reconcile
the Court's expansive view of immunity expressed in Hans with the principles embodied in the Supremacy
Clause and Article M.
If Young may be seen as merely the natural consequence of Hans, it is equally unsurprising as an event
in the longer history of sovereign immunity doctrine, for the rule we speak of under the name of Young is so
far inherent in the jurisdictional limitation imposed by sovereign immunity as to have been recognized since
the Middle Ages. For that long it has been settled doctrine that suit against an officer of the Crown permitted
relief against the government despite the Crown's immunity from suit in its own courts and the maxim that
the king could do no wrong....
B
This history teaches that it was only a matter of course that once the National Constitution had provided
the opportunity for some recognition of state sovereign immunity, the necessity revealed through six centuries
or more of history would show up in suits against state officers, just as Hans would later open the door to
Ex parte Young itself. Once, then, the Eleventh Amendment was understood to forbid suit against a State
eo nomine, the question arose "which suits against officers will be allowed and which will not be". . . .
The decision in Exparte Young, and the historic doctrine it embodies, thus plays a foundational role in
American constitutionalism, and while the doctrine is sometimes called a "fiction," the long history of its felt
necessity shows it to be something much more estimable, as we may see by considering the facts of the
case .....
A rule of such lineage, engendered by such necessity, should not be easily displaced, if indeed it is
displaceable at all, for it marks the frontier of the enforceability of federal law against sometimes competing
state policies. We have in fact never before inferred a congressional intent to eliminate this time-honored
practice of enforcing federal law. That of course does not mean that the intent may never be inferred, and
where, as here, the underlying right is one of statutory rather than constitutional dimension, I do not in theory
reject the Court's assumption that Congress may bar enforcement by suit even against a state official. But
because in practice, in the real world of congressional legislation, such an intent would be exceedingly odd,
it would be equally odd for this Court to recognize an intent to block the customary application of Er parte
Young without applying the rule recognized in our previous cases, which have insisted on a clear statement
before assuming a congressional purpose to "affect the federal balance". . . .
There is, finally, a response to the Court's rejection of Young that ought to go without saying. Our
long-standing practice is to read ambiguous statutes to avoid constitutional infirmity. This practice alone
(without any need for a clear statement to displace Young) would be enough to require Young's application.
So, too, would the application of another rule, requiring courts to choose any reasonable construction of a
statute that would eliminate the need to confront a contested constitutional issue (in this case, the place of
state sovereign immunity in federal question cases and the status of Union Gas). Construing the statute to
harmonize with Young, as it readily does, would have saved an act of Congress and rendered a discussion
on constitutional grounds wholly unnecessary. This case should be decided on this basis alone.
V
Absent the application of Ex parte Young, I would, of course, follow Union Gas in recognizing
congressional power under Article I to abrogate Hans immunity....
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95-1503 MACK v. U.S.
Firearms-Brady Act-Tenth Amendment-
Commerce Clause-Requirement that state and
local law enforcement personnel conduct federally
mandated background checks of prospective hand-
gun purchasers.
Ruling below (CA 9, 66 F.3d 1025, 64 LW
2169, 57 CrL 1553):
Interim provisions of 1993 Brady Handgun
Control Act that require state and local law
enforcement officers to carry out, in addition to
records maintenance responsibilities, "reasonable
efforts" to ascertain whether prospective hand-
gun buyers are disqualified by law from purchas-
ing handgun, 18 USC 922(s), do not comman-
deer state legislative, regulatory, or policy-
making processes and do not present risk that
state officials will bear brunt of public disapprov-
al of federal policy, in violation of Tenth Amend-
ment as interpreted in New York v. U.S., 505
U.S. 144, 60 LW 4603 (1992); unlike firearms
statute at issue in U.S. v. Lopez, 63 LW 4343
(US SupCt 1995), Brady law regulates sales of
handguns and thus lies within Congress' constitu-
tional authority to regulate interstate commerce;
moreover, legislative history of act contains find-
ing that handgun violence affects interstate com-
merce; judgments upholding local sheriffs' chal-
lenges to records-check provisions are reversed.
Questions presented: (1) Does Congress exceed
its Commerce Clause powers when it orders state
officials, themselves neither engaged in nor inter-
fering with interstate commerce, to exercise their
police powers with regard to commerce? (2) Can
federal statute requiring state officials to investi-
gate and pass upon background of each handgun
purchaser be reconciled with Tenth Amendment
as construed in New York v. U.S. on claimed
distinction that it commandeers state's labor rath-
er than its policymaking?
Petition for certiorari filed 3/18/96, by David
T. Hardy, of Tucson, Ariz.
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95-1478 PRINTZ v. U.S.
Firearms-Brady Act-Tenth Amendment-Re-
quirement that state and local law enforcement
personnel conduct background checks of prospec-
tive handgun purchasers.
Ruling below (Mack v. U.S., CA 9, 66 F.3d
1025, 64 LW 2169, 57 CrL 1553):
Interim provisions of 1993 Brady Handgun
Control Act that require state and local law
enforcement officers to carry out, in addition to
records maintenance responsibilities, "reasonable
efforts" to ascertain whether prospective hand-
gun buyers are disqualified by law from purchas-
ing handgun, 18 USC 922(s), do not comman-
deer state legislative, regulatory, or policy-
making processes and do not present risk that
state officials will bear brunt of public disapprov-
al of federal policy, in violation of Tenth Amend-
ment as interpreted in New York v. U.S., 505
U.S. 144, 60 LW 4603 (1992).
Question presented: Does Congress have power
under Article I, Section 8 of Constitution, consis-
tent with Tenth Amendment as interpreted in
New York v. U.S., to command state-created
chief law enforcement officers to search records
to ascertain whether persons may lawfully pur-
chase handguns, to destroy records concerning
handgun purchasers, and to provide reasons for
adverse determinations, as mandated by Brady
Act, 18 USC 922(s)(2), (6)(B) and (C)?
Petition for certiorari filed 3/15/96, by Ste-
phen P. Halbrook and Richard E. Gardiner, both
of Fairfax, Va.
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SUPREME COURT DECIDES TO REVIEW BRADY LAW CASES
Some Officials Object to Unfunded Background Checks
The Dallas Morning News
Tuesday, June 18, 1996
David Jackson, Washington Bureau
WASHINGTON - The U.S. Supreme Court
agreed Monday to review the Brady law, the
landmark gun-control measure that requires five-day
waiting periods so that local police can check the
backgrounds of prospective handgun buyers.
In accepting cases from Arizona and Montana,
the high court agreed to decide whether Congress
can force local law-enforcement officials to do the
background checks.
Several local sheriffs, including one in South
Texas, have sued over that requirement, calling it an
unconstitutional, unfunded mandate.
"The Brady bill essentially orders local law
enforcement to carry out background checks for a
federal program," said David T. Hardy, the attorney
in the Arizona case involving Graham County
Sheriff Richard Mack. "The federal government
cannot issue an unequivocal demand to the states,
under the commerce clause of the Constitution."
Brady law supporters argued that Congress
needs only temporary help while developing a
computerized "instant check" program expected to
be in place by late 1998. In a legal brief to the
Supreme Court, Solicitor General Drew Days also
asserted a strong, legitimate federal interest in
regulating gun traffic. "The Brady Act is an
important federal statute directed at one of the most
serious issues of public safety currently facing the
nation, the epidemic of gun violence," Mr. Days
wrote.
The high court will hear the case in its next
term. A decision is expected by July 1997, more
than a year before the instant-check system is to
take effect. Attorneys on both sides urged the
justices to consider the Brady law, citing a series of
conflicting opinions in lower courts. Federal judges
in Arizona and Montana struck down the law, but
appeals courts for those states upheld it.
The reverse happened in a case out of Val Verde
County, near the Texas-Mexico border. A San
Antonio federal judge upheld the Brady law, but the
5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in New Orleans
struck down the portion calling for background
checks.
The Brady Act is named for former White
House press secretary James Brady, who was
critically injured in the 1981 assassination attempt
on President Ronald Reagan. Mr. Bradys wife,
Sarah, is chairwoman of Handgun Control Inc., a
major proponent of waiting periods and background
checks designed to prevent the kind of attack that
crippled her husband. "We are not surprised that the
Supreme Court agreed to examine the case given the
split in the circuits," Ms. Brady said, adding she was
confident the high court would uphold the law.
The law, which took effect in 1994, requires a
gun buyer to fill out a form that is reviewed by "the
chief law enforcement officer" in the area. Those
officials then have five business days to check an
applicant's record. According to the U.S.
Justice Department, applicants can be denied gun
ownership if they are: convicted felons, drug users,
undocumented immigrants, minors under 18 years
of age, fugitives or under restraining orders for
allegations of domestic abuse. Applicants also can
be denied if they have been indicted, committed to a
mental institution, renounced their American
citizenship or been dishonorably discharged from
the military.
The Dallas Police Department's records section
reported that, from March 1994 to this May, there
were 33,574 gun applications. There have been
2,361 rejections based on criminal histories.
However, officials said some of those decisions
have been reversed because of erroneous searches or
because people who were on deferred adjudication
have had their records cleared.
Former Val Verde County Sheriff J.R. Koog,
who filed the Texas suit, said the background checks
put too much of a crimp in his $2 million budget.
Mr. Koog, who retired Dec. 31, also argued that his
department would be liable for millions in damages
if one of his researchers made a mistake.
"I don't have the people to analyze these things,"
he said. "It's a badly written law. It has good
intentions, but it's led to nothing."
The high court cases concern Sheriff Mack of
Arizona and Jay Printz, sheriff of Ravalli County,
Mont. Mr. Koog's attorney, Stephen P. Halbrook,
said he wouldn't be surprised if the justices agree
later to add the Texas case. "It is the precedent that
led to the [appeals court] circuits coming into
conflict," said Mr. Halbrook, a Fairfax, Va.,
attorney who specializes in constitutional issues.
"The principles are the same in all three cases."
In recent years, the Supreme Court has criticized
what some justices have called congressional
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overreaching into state and local affairs. The high
court has struck down laws ranging from gun bans
around schools to the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act of 1988.
"They've been real solid behind the 10th
Amendment and states' rights," said Sheriff Mack.
"Here we have Big Brother from Washington
coming in and commandeering the local sheriffs
offices." Mark Polston, an attorney for the Center
To Prevent Handgun Violence, said the Brady law
"does not cross the -line -the court has drawn".
because it requires local background checks for only
a short period of time.
Even though instant checks are set to be in place
by late 1998, Mr. Polston said a court decision
striking down the law could be devastating. "Even in
one year in which there are no background checks,
that could mean 40,000 felons getting access to
handguns," Mr. Polston said.
In a February report issued in connection with
the Brady Act's second anniversary, Treasury
Secretary Robert Rubin and Attorney General Janet
Reno said the law had blocked 60,000 unqualified
gun purchasers.
"Each month the Brady Act is preventing nearly
2,500 criminals from buying guns, while permitting
law-abiding citizens to do so," said Mr. Rubin,
-whose depariment includes the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms.
Chip Walker, a spokesman for the National
Rifle Association, disputed the law's effectiveness,
saying, "I'm sure some of those felons went back out
and found firearms through other means."
The Dallas Morning News Copyright 1996
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BRADY BILL BOOMERANG
The Washington Post
Wednesday, June 1, 1994
David S. Broder
Congress amends or repeals scores of laws each
year, but there is one law that never goes away: the
law of unintended consequences. The latest
boomerang involves the Brady bill, the controversial
measure to impose a five-day waiting period for
purchases of handguns.
It was signed with great publicity last December
as a breakthrough victory for gun-control advocates
and a tribute to the tenacity of Sarah and Jim Brady
-- he the popular press secretary who was badly
wounded in the 1981 assassination attempt against
President Reagan.
Far less attention has been given to the May 16
federal court decision that the key section of the
Brady bill -- requiring a check of criminal records,
drug or mental problems of gun applicants -- is a
violation of the Constitution and unenforceable
anywhere in the country.
The law was not thrown out because it violated
the Second Amendment -- the right to bear arms.
That issue, the battle cry of the National Rifle
Association, was not even raised in this lawsuit.
Rather, it was found to violate one of the most
neglected provisions of the Constitution, the 10th
Amendment, reserving to the states and the people
all powers not assigned to the federal government.
Specifically, District Judge Charles C. Lovell of
Missoula, Mont., said that the feds had overreached
themselves when they told Ravalli County Sheriff
Jay Printz he had to divert deputies from their other
duties to do background checks on Montana gun
buyers.
The last thing Congress had in mind when it
passed the Brady bill was providing another opening
for Washington's critics to raise the issue of
unfunded federal mandates on the states and
localities. Organizations representing cities and
states have been on the warpath all year against the
feds' habit of dreaming up new assignments they
want the lower levels of government to pay for and
carry out. Those unfunded mandates cost billions.
The mandates issue and the 10th Amendment
were raised in congressional debate but brushed
aside in the rush to enact the waiting-period law.
The court, however, in a decision that is certain to
be appealed, said these questions could not be so
easily discarded.
Prior Supreme Court rulings on 10th
Amendment cases are anything but simple to
reconcile or understand. But Judge Lovell found his
footing in a 1992 case in which New York
successfully challenged a federal law requiring
states to dispose of radioactive wastes according to
Congress's directive.
Lovell said his reading of the 6-3 decision in
New Yorkv. United States led him to conclude that
the background check part of the Brady bill is
unconstitutional "because it substantially
commandeers state executive officers and indirectly
commandeers the legislative processes of the state
to administer a federal program."
The five-day waiting period remains in effect,
under the decision, but without background checks,
it obviously doesn't accomplish much. That's a
setback to the hopes of gun-control advocates, of
whom I am one. But the principle raised by Judge
Lovell is a vital one.
Sheriff Printz told the court that he has 16
officers and 13 support people at his disposal to
provide law and order for 30,000 residents scattered
through 2,400 square miles of rugged country near
the Idaho border. Chasing down records, some kept
hundreds of miles away, would divert them from
their other duties, he said. He convinced Judge
Lovell that as a local elected official, he was being
asked by Washington not only to "bear the brunt of
its [the laws] unpopularity" among his gun-owner
constituents but to cut back other activities of his
department or seek a higher budget.
As the judge dryly observed, "The corollary to
state and local governments being held financially
accountable for the act is that the federal
goverment will not be. ... The federal officials will
receive some of the accolades or criticism for their
program, but they will not suffer any of the
consequences for the cost."
The Justice Department argued, unavailingly,
that the imposition on Sheriff Printz and his crew
was minimal and should not raise any constitutional
objections in the judge's mind. It even argued that in
the circumstances facing Sheriff Printz, "a
'reasonable' effort [to do background checks] may
be no effort at all." But the judge wasn't buying that
sophistry.
The underlying issue is very important.
Washington spends all its money and borrows, each
year, hundreds of billions more. Still, that does not
satisfy its appetite for action, so it increasingly has
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fallen into the habit of mandating other people to
carry out and pay for its wishes.
Sometimes, as with the Brady bill, the costs fall
mostly on other governments; sometimes, as with
the Americans With Disabilities Act, on both
private business and the public sector. The causes
are generally good ones, but as this decision reminds
us, there is a reason why the Constitution tried to
limit the reach of federal officials.
It's a matter of accountability. Washington, like
everyone else, has to learn to pay for its good deeds.
The Washington Post Copyright 1994
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Richard MACK, Sheriff of Graham County, Arizona,
Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee
Jay PRINTZ, Sheriff/Coroner, Ravalli County, Montana,
Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee
V.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
66 F.3d 1025
September 8, 1995
... CANBY, Circuit Judge:
Sheriffs Richard Mack and Jay Printz, in separate actions, challenged the constitutionality of the Brady
Handgun Control Act. The main issue on appeal concerns the district courts' respective holdings that section
922(s)(2) of the Brady Act, requiring local law enforcement officials to perform background checks of
handgun purchasers, violates the Tenth Amendment. We conclude that the Act is constitutional, and we
accordingly reverse the judgments of the district courts.
FACTS
The Brady Act, passed in 1993 as an amendment to the Gun Control Act of 1968, imposes a waiting
period of up to five days for the purchase of a handgun, and subjects purchasers to a background check
during that period. Within five years from the effective date of the Act, such checks will be performed
instantaneously through a national criminal background check system maintained by the Department of
Justice, but in the meantime the background checks must be performed by the Chief Law Enforcement
Officer (CLEO) of the prospective purchaser's place of residence. The Act requires CLEOs to "make a
reasonable effort to ascertain ... whether receipt or possession [of a handgun by the prospective buyer]
would be in violation of the law.. . ." The CLEO performs the check on the basis of a sworn statement
signed by the buyer and provided to the CLEO by a federally-licensed gun dealer. If the CLEO approves the
transfer, he or she must destroy the buyer's statement within twenty business days after the statement was
made. If the CLEO disapproves the transfer, the CLEO must provide the reasons for the determination
within twenty business days if so requested by the disappointed purchaser.
Richard Mack and Jay Printz, as sheriffs, are the CLEOs in their respective jurisdictions of Graham
County, Arizona, and Ravalli County, Montana. They brought these actions in their local federal district
courts to challenge the Brady Act's provisions imposing duties upon them. Mack and Printz both invoked
the Tenth and Fifth Amendments. Mack also challenged the Act as violating the Thirteenth Amendment.
Both district courts held that section 922(s)(2) of the Act, by imposing on the sheriffs a mandatory duty
to conduct background checks, violated the Tenth Amendment as interpreted by the Supreme Court in United
States v. New York. Neither court enjoined the provisions of the Act requiring CLEOs to explain the reasons
for rejecting a purchase application, § 922(sX6XC), and requiring destruction of records, § 922(s)(6)(B). The
Printz decision noted that the requirement of a statement of reasons became optional once the mandatory
background check was invalidated, and that the provision for destruction of records was "de minimis."
InMack, the district court also held that the criminal provisions of the Act applied to CLEOs, and were
void for vagueness under the Fifth Amendment because they made it a crime for CLEOs to fail to make a
"reasonable effort" to ascertain the lawfulness of a prospective handgun purchase. The Printz court held that
the criminal provisions did not apply to CLEOs. Finally, the Mack court rejected Mack's Thirteenth
Amendment challenge. Both district courts held that the invalid portions of the Act were severable, and
accordingly refused to hold the entire Act unconstitutional.
343
In both actions, both sides appealed. The sheriffs primarily dispute the holdings of severability, while
the United States contends that the entire Act is constitutional.
ANALYSIS
I. THE TENTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGE
No one in this case questions the fact that regulation of the sales of handguns lies within the broad
commerce power of Congress. The issue for decision is whether the manner in which Congress has chosen
to regulate in the Brady Act violates the Tenth Amendment.
The Tenth Amendment provides that "powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or the people." As a textual matter,
therefore, the Tenth Amendment "states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered."
By its terms, the Amendment does not purport to limit the commerce power or any other enumerated power
of Congress.
In recent years, however, the Tenth Amendment has been interpreted "to encompass any implied
constitutional limitation on Congress' authority to regulate state activities, whether grounded in the Tenth
Amendment itself or in principles of federalism derived generally from the Constitution." Thus, "the Tenth
Amendment confirms that the power of the Federal Government is subject to limits that may, in a given
instance, reserve power to the States." The question before us is whether the Brady Act, by requiring CLEOs
to perform background checks on handgun purchasers, transgressed such an implied limitation on federal
power. We conclude that it did not.
There are numbers of ways in which the federal government is permitted to secure the assistance of state
authorities in achieving federal legislative goals. First and most directly, the federal government may coerce
the states and their employees into complying with federal laws of general applicability. Second, Congress
may condition the grant of federal funds on the States' taking governmental action desired by Congress.
These broad categories do not exhaust, however, the means by which the federal government can enlist
state employees in implementing federal programs. State judicial and administrative bodies may be required
to apply federal law. The federal government may offer to preempt regulation in a given area, and permit
the states to avoid preemption if they regulate in a manner acceptable to Congress.
The federal government has been permitted effectively to compel the states to issue registered rather than
bearer bonds. Finally, the federal government has been permitted to require state utility regulators to consider
prescribed federal standards in determining regulatory policies. In the course of the latter ruling, the Supreme
Court referred to and rejected the "19th century view" that "Congress has no power to impose on a State
officer, as such, any duty whatever, and compel him to perform it." That view, said the Court, "is not
representative of the law today." "The federal government has some power to enlist a branch of state
government . . . to further federal ends."
Against this background, there would appear to be nothing unusually jarring to our system of federalism
in the Brady Act's requirement that CLEOs, during a five-year interim period, "make a reasonable effort to
ascertain" the lawfulness of handgun purchases. The obligation imposed on state officers by the Brady Act
is no more remarkable than, say, the federally-imposed duties of state officers to report missing children, or
traffic fatalities.
Mack and Printz, however, contend that the precedential background set forth above was changed by
United States v. New York, and that the federal government is now flatly precluded from commanding state
officers to assist in carrying out a federal program. We do not read New York that broadly.
Although we concede that there is language in New York that lends support to the view of Mack and
Printz, that language must be interpreted in the context in which it was offered. New York was concerned with
a federal intrusion on the States of a different kind and much greater magnitude than any involved in the
Brady Act. The constitutional evil that New York addressed was one recognized by several of the cases
already cited: the federal government was attempting to direct the States to enact their own legislation or
regulations according to a federal formula.
New York involved the constitutional validity of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments
Act of 1985. The part of the Act that the Court found to violate the Tenth Amendment was the so-called
"take title" provision. Under that provision, a State that failed to regulate radioactive waste according to
congressional standards was simply given title to the waste within its borders (which previously would have
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been in private hands). The waste then became the total responsibility of the State as owner. The alternative
to this unacceptable prospect was for the State to legislate or regulate in a manner that Congress dictated,
and "a direct order to regulate, standing alone, would ... be beyond the power of Congress." Thus, in
response to the government's argument that a strong federal interest supported the "take title" provision, the
Court in New York stated: "whether or not a particularly strong federal interest enables Congress to bring
state governments within the orbit of generally applicable federal regulation, no Member of the Court has
ever suggested that such a federal interest would enable Congress to command a state government to enact
state regulation." In the same vein was the Court's conclusion after reviewing the debates at the time of the
founding of the Constitution:
We have always understood that even where Congress has the authority under the Constitution to pass
laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the-power-directly to compel the States to require or
prohibit those acts.. .. The allocation of power contained in the Commerce Clause, for example, authorizes
Congress to regulate interstate commerce directly; it does not authorize Congress to regulate state
governments' regulation of interstate commerce.
Other decisions of the Supreme Court have recognized this proposition that the federal government
cannot coerce States into performing the ultimately sovereign acts of legislating or regulating in a manner
specified by the federal government. In Virginia Surface Mining, the Court noted that the provision of an
alternative of federal regulation rendered federal standards for state regulation permissible; because the State
had a constitutional option, "there can be no suggestion that the Act commandeers the legislative processes
by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program." Similarly, in FERC v.
Mississippi, the Court noted that the federal command that the State "consider" federal alternatives was
constitutional because "there is nothing in PURPA 'directly compelling' the States to enact a legislative
program."
New York, then, is best read as a case that draws a line already partly delineated in Virginia Surface
Mining and FERC v. Mississippi: the federal government is not entitled to coerce the States into legislating
or regulating according to the dictates of the federal government. Certainly New York did not purport to
overrule Virginia Surface Mining or FERC v. Mississippi, or even to disavow the latter decision's rejection
of the nineteenth century view that the federal government cannot command state employees. New York can
be read consistently with these cases as an instance where "the etiquette of federalism has been violated by
a formal command from the National Government directing the State to enact a certain policy.
There are good reasons for focusing Tenth Amemdment concern on federal coercion of a State's
enactment of legislation or regulations or creation of an administrative program. These activities are
inherently central acts of a sovereign; if an area of state activity is to be protected from direct coercion by an
implication drawn from the Tenth Amendment, legislating and regulating are prime candidates. "The power
to make decisions and to set policy is what gives the State its sovereign nature." There is a second reason,
also, emphasized in New York itself. Democratic governments must be politically accountable. When the
federal government requires the States to enact legislation, the enacted legislation is state legislation. Thus,
it will likely "be state officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal officials who
devised the regulatory program may remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision."
When the federal government itself imposes a requirement on a state official, the requirement is more clearly
an act of the federal government and thus does not, to the same extent, undermine political accountability.
The Brady Act is not the kind of a federal mandate condemned by New York, nor does it present the
concerns related above. The Brady Act does not embody a mandate to the "States" in the sovereign sense
discussed in New York, FERC v. Mississippi, or Virginia Surface Mining. The Brady Act is a regulatory
program aimed at individuals and not the States. It is true that, for a limited period of time, the Act requires
state law enforcement officials, the CLEOs, to make reasonable efforts to assist in carrying out the federal
program. But the CLEOs are not being commanded to engage in the central sovereign processes of enacting
legislation or regulations. They are not even being asked to produce a state policy, for which the state must
bear political accountability. Instead, they are directed to serve for a temporary period as law enforcement
functionaries in carrying out a federal program. Their activities are not alien to their usual line of work, and
represent a minimal interference with state functions. In that sense, their duties are not different from other
minor obligations that Congress has imposed on state officials.
Mack and Printz do not agree that the Brady Act's interference with their state duties is minimal. They
point out that there are many factors that may make a prospective handgun purchase illegal under the Act.
A purchase is unlawful, for example, if the purchaser is a fugitive, is an unlawful user of a controlled
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substance, has been adjudicated a mental defective, has been dishonorably discharged from the aimed forces,
has renounced his citizenship, or is under certain restraining orders involving an intimate partner. They also
contend that it will be unduly burdensome to give reasons for rejecting a proposed purchase, within 20 days
of being requested by the disappointed purchaser. Mack and Printz point out that they are sheriffs in rural
counties with limited staffs and resources. To research for all of these disabilities and to give reasons for
rejection, Mack and Printz argue, will either take all of their time or so much of it that they will be unable to
perform their regular county duties.
The government, on the other hand, argues that there is no requirement that CLEOs pursue all of these
avenues of potential disqualification. They are enjoined only to "make a reasonable effort," and the statute's
only fixed requirement is a search in whatever recordkeeping systems are available and in a national system.
Id. A reasonable effort, the government contends, might in the circumstances of Mack and Printz simply be
a check of the existing computer records.
We agree, and the government concedes, that there is likely to be some point at which a federal statute
that enlists the aid of state employees can become so burdensome to the State that it violates the Tenth
Amendment. Surely the federal government cannot stall the state government in its tracks by imposing
all-consuming federal duties on the State's employees. We conclude, however, that the Brady Act does not
approach that point. Mack and Printz have not demonstrated that the Act will interfere unduly with their
duties. Indeed, to a considerable degree, the dispute over the magnitude of the burden imposed upon them
is not ripe for resolution. Mack and Printz have not been subjected to any interpretation of the Act, or any
attempt to enforce it against them, that requires them to do more than check computer records. On this record,
we cannot conclude that "a reasonable effort" inevitably requires more than this minimum for Mack and
Printz. To perform such computer checks, and to explain reasons for rejection when and if disappointed
purchasers so request, has not been shown to constitute the kind of interference with state functions that
would raise Tenth Amendment concerns. It follows even more strongly that the minimal requirement of
destruction of records presents no constitutional problem.
We also find no support for the Tenth Amendment claims of Mack and Printz in the cases from our
circuit that they cite. In Board ofNatural Resources we held that the Forest Resources Conservation and
Shortage Relief Act violated the Tenth Amendment. That Act however - akin to the statute in New York -
required the States to issue regulations and was far more demanding of state officials than the Brady Act.
And Brown, like Board ofNatural Resources, involved regulations that clearly intruded upon a state's
sovereignty, unlike the contested provisions of the Brady Act. Additionally, Brown relied upon the Tenth
Amendment view espoused in Kentucky v. Dennison, overruled by Puerto Rico v. Branstad, that "the
Federal Government . .. has no power to impose on a State officer, as such, any duty whatsoever .. ." As
the Supreme Court has made clear, the view espoused in Kentucky v. Dennison is no longer representative
of the law. We therefore reject Mack's and Printz's Tenth Amendment challenges to the Brady Act.
II. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT VAGUENESS CHALLENGE
Section 924(a)(5) of the Act provides that "whoever knowingly violates subsection (s)" of the Act is
subject to fine or imprisonment or both. Mack and Printz contend that this provision subjects them to
criminal liability for failing to "make a reasonable effort" to ascertain whether a particular purchase would
violate the law, as required by section 922(s)(2). So construed, the criminal provision is unconstitutionally
vague, according to Mack and Printz, because a person of reasonable intelligence has no way of knowing
what may constitute a "reasonable effort."
It is not at all clear, however, that section 924(a)(5) is intended to apply to the Act's requirements
imposed upon CLEOs. Indeed, the Montana district court viewed the criminal prohibition as ambiguous in
that regard, and concluded that it did not apply to CLEOs.
We decline to reach this issue, however, because it is not ripe. Mack and Printz have not been charged
under the Act with any criminal violations, nor are they likely to be. The United States represented during
oral argument that the Justice Department's official position is that the criminal sanctions of the Brady Act
do not apply to CLEOs. Because Mack and Printz do not face a "credible threat of prosecution," there is no
"case or controversy." In the extremely unlikely event that a criminal prosecution is one day brought against
a CLEO, the constitutional objection may be raised in defense at that time.
We therefore vacate the ruling of the District Court of Arizona that the criminal provisions apply to
CLEOs and are void for vagueness, as well as the ruling of the District Court of Montana that the criminal
provisions do not apply to CLEOs. These claims are to be dismissed as unripe.
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Ill. THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGE
Mack also challenges the Brady Act as violating the Thirteenth Amendment. The Thirteenth Amendment
provides that "neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime . .. shall exist
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." According to Mack, section 922(s)
requires him to perform labor for the United States or face legal sanctions, even though he is not a federal
employee.
Unlike a slave, however, Mack can quit work at any time. By doing so, he escapes all compulsion. The
requirements of the Brady Act are not placed on Mack personally; the duties that are imposed attend the
office. Thus the Brady Act does not coerce Mack "by improper or wrongful conduct" into service by causing
and intending to cause him "to believe that he . .. has no alternative but to perform the labor." The fact that
Mack, if he continues to be sherif, must perform certain duties as a condition of his employment, does not
violate the Thirteenth Amendment.
CONCLUSION
The Brady Act violates neither the Tenth nor Thirteenth Amendment. Mack and Printz's Fifth
Amendment vagueness challenge is not ripe. Accordingly, the district courts' injunctions prohibiting the
United States from enforcing the disputed provisions of the Brady Act are vacated, and the district courts'judgments are reversed insofar as they invalidate portions of the Act. The portions of the cross-appeal in
Mack and the appeal in Printz that challenge the district courts' rulings of severability are dismissed as moot;
in all other respects the rulings challenged by Mack and Printz, are affirmed. The cases are remanded with
instructions to dismiss the vagueness challenges as unripe. The United States is entitled to its costs on appeal.
... FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting:
I concur in parts II and III of the majority opinion, but I respectfully dissent from part I.
This case makes palpable the notion that the states are just a part of the national government, a notion
that was rejected when this country was founded. Congress has previously attempted to order the states to
legislate or regulate in particular ways, and it has failed at that. That is to say, Congress has failed when it
has not given the states the option to avoid the intended yoke. Even those determinations are not without
their problems because they could lead to a "dismemberment of state government."
Now Congress has avoided those issues, but it has done so by eliminating the niceties of the federal-state
relationship entirely. Rather than ordering state legislatures or agencies to adopt a scheme for vetting requests
for gun transfers, Congress has avoided that hindrance and dragooned the state officials directly. Under this
new approach, the states have nothing to say about it. Their officials are ordered to become part of a federal
gun control program at the state's own expense and are ordered to engage in various tasks necessary to
administer that program. Those officials must make a "reasonable effort" to decide whether receipt of a
weapon by a proposed transferee "would be in violation of the law" of the United States. Those efforts must
include "research in whatever State and local recordkeeping systems are available and in a national system
designated by the Attorney General." And the work must be done within five business days. The officials
must also dispose of the materials and may not make any use of them other than that directed by Congress.
They must provide written explanations for negative determinations upon request Presumably those officials
must also adopt appropriate procedures for the carrying out of those functions. Perhaps that is not forced
administration of the federal gun regulation program, but I fail to see why it is not.
Of course, the states are to bear the full cost of these tasks, and, unless the states adopt a local permit
system, they cannot opt out of the federal program. If a state does not choose to engage in the regulation of
this part of commerce - commerce in weapons - that makes no difference at all. In other words, state officials
are conscripted by the federal government to fulfill its purposes and they can do nothing about that.
The government argues that this is much more respectful of state sovereignty than the legislation struck
down in New York. I do not agree. If the Tenth Amendment has anything to do with the separate sovereign
dignity of the states, it is difficult to see how that dignity is not undermined by the reality of a command that
they commit their resources to the carrying out of this kind of federal policy, whether they like it or not.
Moreover, we are not dealing with a situation where a state seeks to stay in the business of regulating
commerce in weapons. Quite the contrary. This legislation impacts states that do not wish to do so. I assume
that the Supreme Court meant what it said when it said:
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States are not mere political subdivisions of the United States. State governments are neither regional
offioes nor administrative agencies of the Federal Government. The positions occupied by state officials
appear nowhere on the Federal Government's most detailed organizational chart. The Constitution
instead "leaves to the several states a residuary and inviolable sovereignty," reserved explicitly to the
States by the Tenth Amendment.
Whatever the outer limits of that sovereignty may be, one thing is clear: The Federal Government may not
compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.
This legislation is a step toward concentrating power in the hands of the federal government, for it treats
state officials and workers as if they were mere federal employees. It makes every CLEO's office an office
of the federal bureaucracy, funded by the states, but directed from Washington. The time to stop this journey
of a thousand miles is at the first step.
Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the majority's determination that the statute does not violate the
Tenth Amendment.
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